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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND STATE IMPLEMENTATION
PLANS: THE SUCCESS (OR FAILURE) OF CITIZEN SUITS
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley Authority'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Air Act ("CAA")2 regulates the amount of pollutants
emitted into the air through individualized state-developed implementation
plans.3  These plans are approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and enforced through suits brought by citizens or state
governments, which pose a variety of penalties (e.g., injunctions, punitive
civil monetary penalties).4 A variety of factors weigh in as to how
successful an action for compliance with the standards will be, but of late
no issue is more important than that of a statute's waiver of sovereign
immunity. While Supreme Court precedent provides some guidance,
circuits are split as to whether the CAA provides a clear waiver of
sovereign immunity for federal agencies.5
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") operates eleven coal-
fired power plants that generate electricity for customers in seven states.6
The plant at issue in this case ("Colbert plant") is located near Tuscumbia,
Colbert County, Alabama, in the northwest corner of the state on the
Tennessee River.7  The Colbert plant runs five generator units.8
' 430 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
2 42 U.S.C § 7401 (2006).
' EPA, The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act, Features of the 1990 Clean Air Act,
available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/pegcaa/pegcaa02.html#topic2a (last visited Apr. 16,
2006).
4 id
5 Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, The Clean Air Act, Sovereign Immunity, and Sleight ofHand in the
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
933, 938 (2000).
6 Sierra Club, 430 F.3d at 1340.
' Id.
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Electricity is generated by burning coal in the unit's furnace, which
produces heat that converts water into steam.9 This steam is transformed
into rotational energy, and a generator converts the energy into electricity
that is distributed across the TVA power grid.' 0 This process releases by-
products into the air, which become air pollutants when not captured."
The plant also maintains a pollution control system.12 This system
captures up to 99.9% of the air pollutants that would otherwise be released
into the air through the electricity generation process.' 3 However, what is
not caught by the pollution control system is released into the air through
two smokestacks.14 Per the state permit requirements for operating the
plant, the TVA maintained a continuous opacity monitoring system
("COMS") in each smokestack to constantly measure the opacity of the
smoke plumes.' 5
Opacity is one of the most basic emission limitations imposed
upon sources of air pollution like the TVA plant.' 6 Opacity is determined
by how much a plume of smoke reduces the transmission of light and is
measured in percentages of the light blocked.'7 Opacity is not a measure
of pollution; however, it is an important indicator of the amount of visible
pollutants discharged by plants under the CAA.' 8
The EPA regulations and the CAA require each state to maintain a
state implementation plan ("SIP") to enforce the national air quality
standards set forth in the CAA.19 In order for the SIP to be effective, the
EPA must approve all relevant sections.20  Alabama maintains a SIP,







"s Id. at 1340-41.
16 Id. at 1341.
17 Id. "COMS measures opacity by projecting a beam of light across the interior diameter of a
smokestack to a mirror mounted on the opposite side . . . ." Id. The device then measures how
much light is reflected back. Id. "COMS then records the amount of light that was absorbed or
scattered on the trip. Id.
19 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. 7410 (2006).
20 See id
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incorporates some provisions of the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management's ("ADEM") Air Pollution Control
Program.2 1 However, not all sections or provisions of this plan were
approved by the EPA and therefore are not a part of Alabama's SIP.22
There are three provisions of the ADEM regulations at issue in this case:
(1) a 20% opacity limitation; (2) the 2% de minimis rule; and (3) the
credible evidence rule.23
The Sierra Club and the Alabama Environmental Council ("AEC")
sued the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") under the CAA.24 The
Sierra Club and the AEC claimed the TVA plant in Colbert County
violated the 20% opacity limitation.25 The violation of the 20% opacity
limitation was an element of the Alabama SIP approved by the EPA.
The complaint alleged over 8,900 individual violations of the opacity
limits during a five-year period from 1997 to 2002.27 The Sierra Club and
AEC sought declaratory and injunctive relief,28 as well as civil penalties in
the amount of $27,500 per day for TVA's violations.29
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted
summary judgment to TVA. 30 The court found that the opacity violations
fell within the ADEM's "2% de minimis rule" forgiveness zone.31
Additionally, the trial court held that the data offered to prove the
violations, which was generated from the Colbert plant's continuous
opacity monitoring system ("COMS"), could not be used to establish
violations before May 20, 1999 because Alabama had not yet adopted the
credible evidence rule. 32 Finally, the court found that even if violations
had occurred, the state had not waived sovereign immunity, and thus no
civil penalties could be imposed.33 The Sierra Club and the AEC
21 Id. Alabama's SIP is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.69 (2006).
22 id
23 id





29 Id. at 1343.
30 Id. at 1339.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1339-40.
13 Id at 1340.
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appealed, challenging the district court's basis for finding that they had
failed to prove violations and the additional ruling that civil penalties
could not be assessed against the TVA.34
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued several holdings.35
First, the court addressed the issue of standing, even though it was not
addressed by the district court or raised on appeal.36 The court held that
the Sierra Club and the AEC had standing to bring suit.37 The court then
reviewed the grants of summary judgment de novo.3 8 The court held that
to be applicable in excusing violations, the 2% de minimis rule must have
itself been authorized or permitted by the SIP.39 However, since Alabama
did not submit the proposed rule for EPA approval, the 2% de minimis
rule was tantamount to an unapproved modification of the opacity
limitation, and the rule chaned what would otherwise be a violation under
the CAA and Alabama SIP. o Therefore, the 2% de minimis rule was not
valid and could not serve as an excuse for the Colbert plant violations. 4 1
The court next considered whether the 2% de minimis rule could be
considered an interpretation of the credible evidence rule.4 2 The Eleventh
Circuit held that that the rule could not be construed in this way to avoid
34 id
36 Id. at 1344.
3 Id. at 1344-45.
38 Id. at 1345-46. Generally a court will review a district court's denial of injunctive relief only for
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1346. However, since injunctive relief was denied here solely because
summary judgment was granted, that is not the appropriate standard. Id. Since summary judgment
is not a discretionary act, it can be reviewed de novo. Id The major issues in the case center on the
grant or denial of summary judgment, so the appeals court reviewed the entire case de novo. Id.
Id.
40 Id. at 1347.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 1340. The credible evidence rule states that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision in [the
ADEM regulations], any credible evidence or information relevant to whether a source would have
been in compliance with applicable requirements if the appropriate performance or compliance test
had been performed, can be used to establish whether or not an owner or operator has violated or is
in violation of any rule or standard in this Division." ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-1-.13(2) (2005).
The EPA mandated that each state adopt its own credible evidence rule in part "to clarify that the
inclusion in a state implementation plan (SIP) of enforceable test methods for SIP emissions limits
does not preclude enforcement based on other credible evidence or information . . . " Credible
Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8316 (Feb. 24, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 60, and 61 (2005)).
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the violations.43 Therefore, TVA was not entitled to summary judgment
on the grounds that there were no violations in light of the 2% de minimis
rule.44
Next, the court considered whether TVA was entitled to summary
judgment based on the use of COMS data to prove violations of the
opacity limitations.4 5 The court found that until the credible evidence rule
was adopted in May of 1999, the regulations commanded use of another
process, Method 9, for measuring opacity.4 6 Once the credible evidence
rule was adopted on May 20, 1999, COMS data was a permissible
measure of opacity violations.47 However, the rule change did not apply
retroactively. Therefore, the COMS data could not be used to prove
emissions violations prior to May 20, 1999.49 The court held that TVA
was entitled to summary judgment with regards to the alleged violations
prior to May 20, 1999.50 The court also rejected the argument that the
federal credible evidence rule was applicable at the time when Alabama's
credible evidence rule was not and held that the federal credible evidence
rule is not available in citizen suits to enforce emissions limitations.5 1
Finally, the court addressed the grant of summary judgment to
TVA regarding Sierra Club and the AEC's claims for civil penalties.52
The court held that Congress, in writing the relevant portions of the
CAA, 53 did not waive the sovereign immunity of TVA from liability for
punitive fines imposed for past conduct.54 Likening the situation to the
previously interpreted Clean Water Act,55 the court found that the United
States and its agencies were not "persons" under the statute, and therefore
43 Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1349.
4 Id. at 1349-50.
45 Id at 1350.
46 Id. at 1350-51. The Method 9 procedure relies on a state-certified observer to visually gauge the
opacity of a plume of smoke as it releases from a smokestack. Id. at 1342. Under Method 9,
observations are conducted only periodically (between I and 15 days in a given year) and during
the day, unlike COMS which monitors constantly. Id.




s' Id. at 1353.
52 id
s See 42 U.S.C. § 304 (2006).
- Sierra Club, 430 F.3d at 1355.
s 33 U.S.C § 1365 (2006).
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civil penalties did not apply.56 The court found that short of a clear and
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity, the TVA could not be liable
since waiver is to be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign.
Because an express waiver from TVA was not found, and a broader
waiver could not be inferred, sovereign immunity was not waived.58 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court properly granted summary
judgment to TVA on the claim for civil penalties for past opacity
violations.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Clean Air Act Generally
The CAA is the nation's primary law for protecting the
environment and public health from air pollution.60 The Air Quality Act
of 1967 established the first air pollution control program. 6' The Air
Quality Act required states to create air quality control regions, adopt air
quality standards for pollutants, and develop implementation plans to
achieve their specified standards.62 When the Act was passed, the federal
government did not set air quality standards and had little control over the
development of the implementation plans. 63 In 1970, Congress passed the
CAA amendments, which began to mold the CAA into its current state. 64
The statute put control of setting air quality standards into the hands of the
EPA, rather than the states, by requiring each state to develop a SIP for the
EPA to approve. 65
The CAA's stated purpose is to promote public health and welfare,
56 Sierra Club, 430 F.3d at 1355.
5 Id at 1357.
59 id
6o Clean the Air, The Clean Air Act: A Primer,
http://www.cleartheair.org/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=24720 (last visited Apr. 18, 2006)
hereinafter "Clean the Air).
, Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans - Thirty-Seven
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initiate and accelerate national research on controlling air pollutants, and
encourage and promote pollution prevention. 66 The CAA accomplishes
these goals by "provid[ing] technical and financial assistance to State and
local governments in connection with the development and execution of
their air pollution prevention and control programs . . . ."67 The statute
seeks continuity and cooperation between federal, state, and local
governments to combat the negative effects of air pollution.6 8
The goals of the CAA are achieved primarily by establishing
emission limitations and standards. 69 State and federal administrators set
limits on the quantity, rate, and concentration of emissions of air
pollutants on a continuous basis. 70 These rules also relate to the modes of
operation and maintenance of emissions sources (e.g., factories). 7 ' The
administrators can set design, equipment, work practice, and operational
standards under the statute.
The rules and standards determined by the administrators are
codified in a set of individual state and federal implementation plans
(discussed below). These plans include enforceable emissions limits,
control measures, means and techniques, and generally provide for ways
to attain the relevant national ambient air quality standard.74
Implementation plans are relevant and enforceable against emission
sources only if they have been approved by the EPA under section 7410 of
the statute. 5
The benefits of the CAA are numerous. The regulations
promulgated in the CAA have helped save lives and avoid illnesses. 76 The
CAA helps protect national parks and wildernesses, and aids in cleaning
up the scourge of acid rain. In addition, the returns to society from its
' 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2006).67 Id. § 7401(b)(3).
61 Id. § 7401(c).
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monetary investment in the CAA have dramatically exceeded the costs.78
If states or emissions sources fail to comply with the provisions in
the CAA, the EPA has several enforcement options to reach the goals and
benefits of the CAA. Although states promulgate implementation plans,
the federal government enforces these plans. 79 If a violation offends any
state's implementation plan, the EPA must notify the violator and the state
in which the violation occurred.80 Thirty days after such notice, the EPA
can issue compliance orders, levy administrative penalties, or initiate civil
proceedings in federal court.8' The EPA may also impose criminal
penalties for violation of CAA provisions.82
The EPA's authority to issue compliance orders is nearly
boundless-the only prerequisite is a notice of non-compliance.83
However once a compliance order is issued, if a violator avoids complying
with the order, the violator will be subject to stiff penalties.84 The CAA
permits the EPA to impose administrative penalties of up to $25,000 per
day for each violation and civil penalties of up to $5,000 per day for each
violation. Under section 120, there are no limitations for penalties if the
punishments are intended to deprive violators of the full economic benefits
of violations. 86  The EPA may also issue permanent and temporary
injunctions in its attempts to enforce the CAA and state implementation
plans. 87
B. State Implementation Plans
Air pollution is regulated by federal, state, and local law under the
police powers. SIPs, created by state governments, are the primary
implementation mechanisms for achieving clean air.89 States intend SIPs
78 Id. The EPA estimates that for every $1 the public spends, it receives $40 in return. Id









88 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 163 (2005).
89 Daniel P. Selmi, Conformity, Cooperation, and Clean Air: Implementation Theory and its
263
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
to be "comprehensive strategies for ensuring attainment of the national
ambient air quality standards." 90 In formulating SIPs, states must consult
with local governments and officials. State and local governments are to
jointly determine their respective responsibilities for planning,
implementing, and enforcing a SIP to meet the standards.91 States must
show they have the legal authority to carry out the plan contained in the
SIP by identifying the organizations responsible, setting forth their
responsibilities, and including agreements and memoranda of
understanding from the organizations.9
The only restriction or limitation on SIPs is that the EPA must
approve them; states have the primary responsibility of establishing
implementation plans intended to meet air quality standards. 93 States have
considerable latitude in setting standards, as long as they are consistent
with the CAA and legislative intent.94  The CAA leaves considerable
discretion to the states in choosing the mix of pollution control devices.9 5
If a state's SIP meets the statutory requirements, the EPA will approve it.96
However, the CAA prohibits any federal agency from supporting,
permitting, or approving any activity that does not conform to an approved
SIP.97 If a state fails to promulgate an SIP, the federal agency may create
a SIP for it.98 The EPA will intervene only if a state is unsuccessful in its
air pollution control planning attempts and fails to create an SIP.99
The EPA may apply significant sanctions if the states do not
submit and carry out measures to attain national air quality standards,
including when a state does not have its own SIP.100 Thus, the EPA will
sanction a state without an SIP, and then create and maintain an SIP for
that state until it creates one for itself.10' The CAA's structure relies on
Lessons for Air Quality Regulation, 1990 ANN. SURv. Am. L. 149,149(1991).
9 Id. at 151-52.
91 Id
92 id
9 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 163.
94 id
95 Selmi, supra note 90, at 152.
96 Reitze, supra note 61, at 211.
9 Selmi, supra note 90, at 154.
9' 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 163.
9 Selmi, supra note 90, at 152.
'0 Id. at 153.
101 Id.
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the states to carry out federally established standards and leaves oversight
to the EPA through sanctions, if necessary.102
Alabama's state implementation plan is contained in chapter 335
of the Alabama Administrative Code 03 and codified federally in chapter
40, section 52.69 of the C.F.R.104 Alabama's SIP provides that "no person
shall discharge into the atmosphere from any source of emission,
particulate of an opacity greater than that designated as twenty percent
(20%) opacity, as determined by a six (6) minute average."'o5 The SIP
permits the Director of the Department of Environmental Management to
approve exceptions to the rule, provided that the exceptions regard startup,
shutdown, load change, rate change, or other short, intermittent periods of
time.106 The SIP provides for use of a continuous opacity monitoring
system as an indication of opacity emissions. 107 The Alabama SIP, as
written, also contains a provision that is referred to as the "2% de minimis
rule," 0 8 which the EPA has not approved or incorporated into the SIP
codified in the C.F.R. 09
After the EPA developed the credible evidence standard (discussed
below), the Alabama SIP also incorporated the credible evidence rule into
its own state plan."l0 Alabama's code states that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision . . . , an owner or operator may use any credible evidence
or information relevant to whether a source would have been in
compliance with applicable requirements if the appropriate performance or
compliance test had been performed . . . ."' The next section permits
anyone to use such credible evidence to establish whether an owner or
operator has violated or is in violation of any rule of the SIP.112
Alabama's credible evidence rule became effective on May 20,
1999.113 The EPA re-approved Alabama's SIP, including the new credible
102 id.
103 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-1 (2005).
'0 40 C.F.R. § 52.69 (2006).
105 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-4-.01(1)(a).
1' ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-4-.01(1)(c).
107 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-4-.01(3)(a).
108 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-4-.01(4).
'09 Sierra Club, 430 F.3d at 1340.
110 ALA ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-1-.13.
"' ALA ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-1-.13(1).
112 ALA ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-1-.13(2).
113 See ALA ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-1-.13.
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evidence provisions on November 3, 1999.114 The EPA approved the
changes as consistent with EPA and CAA policy, and in conformity with
the requirement that states must include this rule in their SIPs."15
C. Credible Evidence Rule
In 1993 the EPA began drafting a proposal to amend the C.F.R. to
eliminate language that provided for exclusive reliance on reference test
methods as the only means of demonstrating compliance with the CAA.116
The revisions, entitled the "credible evidence" rule, clarified that non-
reference test data could be used in CAA enforcement actions.' In
October of 1999, the EPA called for all states to adopt the credible
evidence rule in their individual SIPs. This ensured that evidentiary rules
for CAA violations were consistent in all fifty states." 8
Section 113 of the CAA authorizes the EPA to bring
administrative, criminal, or civil actions "on the basis of any information
available to the Administrator."ll 9 The EPA has clear statutory authority
to use any information-both reference test and any other data from
federally promulgated and approved compliance methods.120 Case law, in
interpreting the statute, had previously held that only reference test data
could be used to prove violations of the CAA.121 Drafters designed the
credible evidence amendment to overrule this line of cases.122 The CAA
only limits the EPA by general evidentiary rules in enforcement of the
CAA, and not solely by the use of reference method data.123 The credible
evidence amendments eliminated any potential ambiguity relating to the
114 EPA, Approval and Promulgation ofImplementation Plans: Revisions to the Alabama
Department ofEnvironmental Management (ADEM) Administrative Code for the Air Pollution
Control Program, 64 F.R. 59633-01, 59633 (Wed. Nov. 3, 1999).
115 Id.
116 EPA, Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 F.R. 8314-01, 8314 (Mon. Feb. 24, 1997).
in Id. The credible evidence rule changes 40 C.F.R. sections 51.212, 52.12, 52.30, 60.11, and
61.12. Id. This rule became effective on April 25, 1997. Id.
118 Id.
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use of non-reference test data.' 24
The EPA merely intended the revisions to address a rule of
evidence, and not to affect the stringency of the underlying emission
standards or amend the nature of the compliance obligation.' 25  The
credible evidence rule does not affect the emission standard-the statute
already requires continuous compliance unless specified otherwise.126
Also, the rule does not affect the existing requirements for periodic testing
and inspection.127 Regardless of the use of credible evidence, states must
continue to comply with the testing procedures established in their SIPs.128
The rules also do not identify any particular set of data as more probative
of a violation than others.' 29 If an SIP identifies a particular approved
method to determine compliance, data from this identified method will be
the benchmark against which other credible evidence data will be
measured.130
Prior to the credible evidence rule, state regulatory agencies relied
primarily on infrequent on-site inspections and infrequent reference tests
to check compliance.'31 Data other than reference methods was already
available and utilized for other pu oses, and it was an easy transition to
use such data to prove compliance.' 2
This rule also puts emissions sources and potential enforcers on the
same evidentiary footing in enforcement actions.133 Anyone can pursue
actions based exclusively on any credible evidence, without the need to
rely on data from any particular reference test.' 34 The EPA, states, and
citizens can use the credible evidence to assess and respond to non-
compliance by sources.' 35 Citizens have used and continue to use credible
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The determination that the evidence or data is credible is merely a
determination that it is legally admissible and relevant in the enforcement
action. 137 The credible evidence data bears on whether the EPA would
have found the facility in compliance during the period in question if the
facility had conducted the appropriate performance test.3 Congress
intended the threshold for evidence to bring a suit to be a low one.1 39
Congress' emphasis on providing reliable and timely compliance
information is inconsistent with the notion that only data from infrequently
performed reference tests is relevant to compliance certification and
enforcement actions.140 This was the primary policy for the adoption of
the credible evidence rule.
The credible evidence rule meets the EPA's overall goal of
deterrence.141 The fundamental goal of the CAA and emission standards
is to achieve clean air.142 Routine compliance is critical to achieving these
goals.143
D. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is not mentioned in the Constitution, but "the
Supreme Court has recognized and routinely enforced this federal
protection since 1821 ."l4 The rule rests both in tradition and practical
administration.145 Because the Constitution doesn't mention the doctrine,
Congress is free to waive it, and does so in many instances.146 However, it
is unclear what steps must be taken for Congress to waive the immunity in
environmental regulatory schemes.147
Over the past ten years, the Supreme Court has curtailed the
situations where a court may find that Congress has waived sovereign
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immunity.148 There are four rules by which waivers are to be interpreted:
(1) "a waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in the statutory text;" (2) "a waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of
its scope, in favor of the sovereign;" (3) when involving a suit claiming
monetary damages, "the waiver must extend unambiguously to such
monetary claims;" and (4) "a statute's legislative history cannot supply a
wavier that does not appear clearly in any statutory text."l 49 Even if and
when legislative history is clear, a court must ignore it if the waiver is not
clearly in the text of the statute.'50
The issue of whether the CAA waives sovereign immunity is one
of varied interpretation. Circuits are split, despite guidance from the
Supreme Court when it interpreted similar provisions in the Clean Water
Act.' 5 As early as 1978, the EPA stated that the CAA waived sovereign
immunity in its entirety.' 52  Yet, several district courts have found
otherwise.153 The Supreme Court interpreted almost identical sections of
the Clean Water Act to not waive sovereign immunity.154 Despite the
Supreme Court's interpretation, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v.
Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board,55 found that the CAA fully
waived sovereign immunity.156  The rules for determining whether
sovereign immunity exists in a particular statute renders the waiver
provision in the CAA questionable, despite legislative history. 57
The relevant provision to sovereign immunity in the CAA is
section 7481.58 This section requires facilities owned or operated by the
federal government to comply with a state's SIP.159 Further, the federal
entity should comply with all requirements, administrative authority,
processes, and sanctions in the same manner and to the same extent as any
148 Id. at 939.
149 id.
"s0 Id. at 940.
151 Id.
1' Id. at 935.
I54 Id.
'5s 185 F.3d 529 (6th 1999).
156 Schlegelmilch, supra note 5, at 935.
Is Id. at 940.
1s8 Id. at 937; see 42 U.S.C. § 7481 (2006).
15 Id
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other non-governmental entity.' 60
The Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision in the Clean
Water Act in Department of Energy v. Ohio.161 The Court held that in a
citizen suit, coercive penalties were appropriate against a federal agency,
but punitive penalties were not.162 The Court reached this conclusion by
closely scrutinizing the language of "civil penalties" and "persons" in the
statute, and ultimately the Court found that a "person" did not include the
federal government and thus did not waive sovereign immunity.163 The
Court also noted that Congress intended federal facilities to be subject to
any processes and sanctions, but those sanctions did not necessarily imply
punitive measures.
It seems that such an interpretation by the Supreme Court would be
controlling, since the Clean Water Act contains nearly identical provisions
to the CAA.' 65  However, district courts have interpreted this holding
expansively and have reached varying results concerning the CAA.166 The
court adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning as applied to the CAA in
United States v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources 67 and in
California Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management District v.
United States,168 but not in the district or appellate court's decision in
United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board.'6 9 In the latter,
the district court found the CAA to be sufficiently different from the Clean
Water Act as to warrant a waiver of sovereign immunity, which was
unequivocal and unambiguous.' 7 0
When courts are faced with an arguably ambiguous waiver
provision, a federal court must choose between two options. '7  The court
can either engage in a "tortured discussion" of the statutory text to find the
requisite "unequivocal expression" of waiver, or ignore legislative intent
160 Id. at 937-38.
161 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
162 Schlegelmilch, supra note 5, at 941.
163 Id. at 942.
164 Id. at 94243.
165 Id. at 944.
167 897 F.Supp. 1464 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
16' 215 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2000).
169 185 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 1999).
170 Schlegelmilch, supra note 5, at 947.
' Id. at 950.
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and reach a result that may or may not be contrary to Congress's desired
intent. 72
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the court of appeals first reviewed
Alabama's SIP to determine what the plan incorporated and what
provisions had EPA approval, specifically focusing on the three provisions
at issue in this case.173  The court found that the SIP incorporated
Alabama's 20% opacity limitation, along with four exceptions to the
opacity limitations.1 74 The court also found that the opacity limitations
required Method 9 compliance observations and that authorization to
measure opacity using COMS was missing from the SIP. 75
The court did not, however, find that the 2% de minimis rule was
part of the approved SIP.17 6 The rule allows a safe harbor period from the
20% opacity limitations. '" Under the rule, emissions as measured by
COMS may exceed the 20% limitation for up to 2% of the operating hours
of the plant in each quarter, measured in six minute intervals and
excluding times when other approved exceptions apply.'78  The court
found that while the rule may have been a practice of the ADEM, it was
not officially adopted as part of the ADEM regulations until October of
2003, over a year after the commencement of this suit.' 79 The court held
that the 2% de minimis rule was not and has never been a part of
172 id
173 Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1341.
174 Id. The opacity provision contains for exceptions to the 20% limitation:
(1) an exception that allows any source to emit a plume with opacity of up to
40% for one six-minute period per hour; (2) a source-specific exception for
'startup, shutdown, load change, and rate change or other short, intermittent
periods upon terms approved by the Director [of ADEM] and made a part of
[the source's] permit;' (3) an exception that allows the Director of ADEM to
adjust the opacity limitation for a source that discharges a pollutant for which
there is no ambient air quality standard; and (4) a domestic source exception.
Id.
"s Id. at 1341-42.
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Alabama's SIP because the EPA had never approved it.180
Finally, the court examined the credible evidence rule to determine
its inclusion in the SIP.'8 ' The parties stipulated, and the court agreed,
that the credible evidence rule permitted COMS data to establish opacity
violations.182 However, the court found that the credible evidence rule
was not adopted and did not become effective until May 20, 1999.183
Therefore, the use of COMS data regarding violations before this date was
impermissible.184 Since the Sierra Club and the AEC provided no other
evidence of violations besides the COMS data for alleged violations
before May 20, 1999, the court affirmed summary judgment for TVA on
this issue.'8 5  The court did, however, permit COMS data to prove
violations after the May 20th effective date, since it was effectively
incorporated into the SIP via the credible evidence rule. 86
Before turning to arguments on the merits, the court discussed the
issue of standing. TVA had raised the issue of standing in the district
court.'8 8 Although the district court did not address the issue and TVA did
not renew the argument on appeal, the court considered the issue by its
own motion. 189 The court identified the elements of standing for both
individuals and corporations. 190 In satisfaction of the first organizational
standing requirement, the court found that each organization had
individual members who had standing. 191 The court also held that the
Sierra Club and AEC met the additional standing requirements because
their actions furthered the organizational purposes and the presence of the
181 id
182 Id at 1343.
183 id
184 id
185 Id. at 1350.
186 id
.87 Id. at 1344.
188 Id
189 Id
190 Id. Organizational standing requires that (1) the individual members "would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right," (2) "the interests at stake are germane to the organization's
purpose," and (3) "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit." Id.
191 Id at 1345. Individual standing requires that in order to sue, the individual have (1) injury in
fact, (2) an injury is traceable to the alleged violation, and (3) the primary remedy sought will
lessen the injury. Id.
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individual members was not necessary to adjudication of the suit.' 92
After determining which provisions of the SIP had force in this
suit, and making sure the parties had standing, the court next addressed the
arguments on which summary judgment was based. The primary question
was whether Alabama's 2% de minimis rule, followed as a practice by the
ADEM, applied to excuse the alleged violations.' 93 If the rule did apply,
then the suit was over because no violations would have occurred.194 The
court determined that to be valid in determining violations of the opacity
limitations, the SIP must have authorized or permitted the 2% de minimis
rule.195  The CAA requires that no state may modify or change any
requirements in the SIPs without EPA approval.196  Unless the EPA
specifically adopted and approved the 2% de minimis rule, the rule could
not be considered as an element of the plan or used to measure
violations.197 The court held the 2% de minimis rule was an unapproved
modification to the opacity limitations in Alabama's SIP because the rule
changed what would otherwise be considered violations into non-
violations.198 The court held the rule could not be construed and used to
excuse the alleged violations.199
TVA countered this argument by alleging that the use of the 2% de
minimis rule was really ADEM's interpretation and application of the
credible evidence rule. 200 TVA reasoned that in adopting the credible
evidence rule and allowing for COMS data to prove violations, the state
increased the effectiveness of enforcement and thus also increased the
stringency of the standard being enforced.20' TVA argued that ADEM's
2% de minimis rule was necessary to offset the increased effectiveness of
COMS in discovering violations of the 20% opacity rule, since Method 9
enforcement was never as precise or relentless as COMS. 202
192 id





'98 Id. at 1346-47.
'9 Id. at 1347.
200 id
201 Id. at 1348.
202 id.
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The court soundly rejected TVA's argument, holding that a state's
interpretation of its implementation plan could not change the CAA
mandate of continuous compliance.2 03 Again, the court reiterated that the
2% de minimis rule was never subject to EPA approval and thus could not
be considered an exception to the 20% opacity limitations.204 TVA again
was not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that the data did not
show violations when viewed in light of the 2% rule.205
Next, the court reviewed the substantive arguments concerning the
use of COMS data, the credible evidence rule, and existence of violations,
all of which are intertwined.206  The court determined that before the
adoption of the credible evidence rule in May of 1999, Alabama state
regulations provided that opacity "shall be determined by conducting
observations in accordance with Reference Method 9.",207 The court held
the language was unambiguous and required that opacity data be collected
only by a field observer using Method 9 to determine compliance. 20 8
Moreover, the language of the rule did not require retroactive application,
as the Sierra Club and the AEC argued. 209  Therefore, the court held
COMS data could not be used to determine pre-May 1999 emissions
violations.210
The Sierra Club and the AEC argued against this reasoning,
contending that the federal evidence rule,2 11 adopted in 1997, allowed for
203 Id. at 1348-49.
204 Id. at 1349.




209 Id at 1351.
210 Id
211 Id. The federal credible evidence rule provides:
(c) For purposes of Federal enforcement, the following test procedures and
methods shall be used, provided that for the purpose of establishing whether or
not a person has violated or is in violation of any provision of the plan, nothing
in this part shall preclude the use, including the exclusive use, of any credible
evidence or information, relevant to whether a source would have been in
compliance with applicable requirements if the appropriate performance or
compliance test procedures or methods had been performed:
(1) Sources subject to plan provisions which do not specify a test procedure and
sources subject to provisions promulgated by the Administrator will be tested
by means of the appropriate procedures and methods prescribed in part 60 of
this chapter unless otherwise specified in this part.
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the use of COMS data to prove opacity violations at the Colbert plant. 212
The Sierra Club and the AEC argued that with the adoption of the federal
rule, the credible evidence rule automatically became a part of every
SIP. 2 13 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that it was clear that each
state was required to adopt its own individual credible evidence rule as
part of each SIP. 2 14 Additionally, the court determined the plain language
of the federal credible evidence rule made it unavailable to enforce
emissions limitations in citizen suits.2 15 Thus, the court affirmed the grant
of summary judgment to TVA on the alleged opacity violations occurring
before May 20, 1999.216 However, the court did determine that the
credible evidence rule and COMS data could be used to prove violations
after May 20, 1999, and therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment
to TVA for violations after this date, remanding the case to the district
court for further proceedings on that issue.217
Finally, the court determined that TVA was entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of civil penalties because TVA did not waive
sovereign immunity.218 The court carefully examined the text of the CAA
to discern whether Congress waived sovereign immunity of federal
agencies, like TVA, from liability for punitive fines in citizen suits.2 19
This was an issue of first impression. The court compared the situation to
that in Department of Energy v. Ohio,220 where the Supreme Court held
that the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act did not waive federal
government sovereign immunity with respect to punitive fines for past
conduct.221 The Eleventh Circuit also looked at City of Jacksonville v.
Department of the Navy,222 which held that waivers of sovereign immunity
(2) Sources subject to approved provisions of a plan wherein a test procedure is
specified will be tested by the specified procedure.
40 C.F.R. § 52.12(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
212 Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1351.
213 id
214 Id. at 1351-52.
215 Id. at 1352.
216 Id. at 1353.
217 Id. at 1357.
218 Id. at 1353.
219 id.
220 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
"' Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1354.
222 348 F.3d 1307 (2003).
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must be unequivocally expressed, and waivers will be strictly construed in
favor of the sovereign. 22 In City of Jacksonville, the court found that
under the CAA, the general waiver of sovereign immunity was limited
only to coercive fines. 24 The statute refers to "persons," which, based on
prior case law, the court held not applicable to the federal government.22S
The court read the statutory provision in a rational way to not waive
sovereign immunity, as it was required to do.226 The court held the CAA
does not waive sovereign immunity against punitive fines for past conduct
and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to TVA on the claim for civil
penalties.227
V. COMMENT
The CAA clearly requires federal governmental agencies to
comply with state regulatory schemes like any non-governmental agency,
but the CAA is unclear how this compliance can be enforced in light of
sovereign immunity. 228  This case and the legal progeny present an
interesting issue of whether the CAA actually waived sovereign immunity.
While the Eleventh Circuit came to the conclusion that sovereign
immunity was not waived,229 sticking closely to the precedent laid out by
the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion and
disavowed Supreme Court precedent. 230  The Sixth Circuit affirmed a
lower court decision in Tennessee Air Pollution and found that the CAA
unequivocally and unambiguously waived sovereign immunity to punitive
civil penalties for past pollution. 31 The varying outcomes are a result of
differing uses of legislative history, application of prior Supreme Court
doctrine, and analysis of statutory language.
The Eleventh Circuit gave little deference to the legislative history
of the CAA in determining whether the act waived sovereign immunity,
223 Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1355.
224 id
225 Id. at 1356.
226 id
227 Id. at 1357.
228 Schlegelmilch, supra note 5, at 933.
229 Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1355.
230 See Tennesee Air Pollution, 185 F.3d 529.
231 Schlegelmilch, supra note 5, at 933.
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while the Sixth Circuit did give it consideration. Should a court really
ignore legislative history in determining sovereign immunity issues?
Consistently, the Supreme Court has answered that question
affirmatively.232 However, the Sixth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court
mantra of ignoring legislative history, but did so because the CAA
includes statutory language that is not present in the Clean Water Act.233
The CAA contains section 7604(e), which states that nothing in that
section shall restrict the rights of any person to seek enforcement under
applicable air quality laws (state or federal) of emissions standards or any
other relief or judicial action, including against the administrator, a state
agency, or the United States or its agencies. 234
The Sixth Circuit believed this difference in language made the
waiver unambiguous and also different enough from Department of
Energy to justify the difference in the holdings. 235 The court believed this
statutory language expressly overruled the normal default of sovereign
immunity.236 The Sixth Circuit decision also seems to rest on the idea that
statutory language is inherently imprecise, as Congress cannot anticipate
ex ante every issue of statutory interpretation or application.23 7 When two
plausible alternative readings of the statute exist, as they do here with the
issue of sovereign immunity, the legislative history is necessary to decide
the outcome.
The Supreme Court's decision in Department ofEnergy, as applied
to the CAA, makes the purported waiver provision of the CAA
questionable, despite clear legislative history and the statute's stated
purpose, and in some ways undermines the effect of the statute. To make
waiver of sovereign immunity available, a court must strain to find a
waiver in the statute's text, or else deny a remedy that clearly seems
intended by the act.238 The Supreme Court has left lower courts with a
difficult cannon of interpretation, as evidenced by the conflicting results
between the Clean Water Act and the CAA, as well as between different
232 Id. at 940.
233 Id. at 951.
234 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006).
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circuits.
The issue of whether the CAA in fact waives sovereign immunity
is an important one that needs immediate attention. If the CAA does not
waive sovereign immunity, a citizen can sue federal agencies for
compliance with the CAA but have little means of enforcing a court
decision in their favor, since punitive penalties are not available.
However, if the CAA explicitly waives sovereign immunity, citizen suits
and subsequent judgments will have more bite, as federal agencies are
subject to stiff penalties. An express waiver of sovereign immunity may
give the statute more effect, especially against federal agencies. The risk
of penalty would encourage compliance.
Ultimately this issue will have to be decided by the Supreme
Court. In light of its decision in Department of Energy v. Ohio, the
outcome under the CAA is likely to mirror the Court's outcome in
interpreting the Clean Water Act-sovereign immunity will not be
waived. However, the Court must reconsider the importance of legislative
history and must give careful attention to the differences in statutory
language between the Clean Water Act and the CAA. The best outcome
seems to be that sovereign immunity should be waived in the case of the
CAA and quite possibly in the case of other environmental statutes.239
Even if sovereign immunity waiver applies to citizen suits, citizen
suit success is also affected by the individual state's implementation plan
and the interplay of the credible evidence rule. Here, the Sierra Club was
successful because the court found that Alabama's SIP did not incorporate
the 2% de minimis rule. 240 The SIP allowed for changes to emissions
standards, but only for times such as start up, shut down, or other limited
time periods. 24 1 The 2% de minimis rule was too broad to be included in
the SIP without EPA approval. However, it seems from the court's
holding and the interpretation of the CAA and SIPs that the state could
give more leeway in emissions to corporations if the change was limited to
one of the defined time periods, regardless of how much more emissions
output the change would allow. If the change in the SIP had been related
to one of these times, the Sierra Club likely would not have prevailed.
239 Id. at 956.
240 Sierra Club, 430 F. 3d at 1347.
241 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-3-4-.01(1)(c) (2005).
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The credible evidence rule, also adopted as part of an SIP,
influences citizen suit success in a positive way. The credible evidence
rule permits any evidence tending to prove violations to be permitted in
proving actual violations.242 The adoption of the credible evidence rule
helps citizen suits but is harmful to the companies or utilities because it
permits the company's own monitoring data to be used against it in
proving violations.243 Thus, citizens can use the companies own evidence
of lack of compliance against it without the effort of searching for other
outside data or official monitoring reports. This encourages companies to
comply with the emissions standards and to redress noncompliance as
soon as discovered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit properly applied the statute to limit
Alabama's 2% de minimis rule, as well as to allow the use of COMS data
in the prosecution of the Tennessee Valley Authority by the Sierra Club.
The Eleventh Circuit stretched Supreme Court precedent in dealing with
the Clean Water Act to apply to the CAA and bar the Sierra Club from
enforcing civil penalties, since the court held that sovereign immunity was
not waived. While this seems to be the logical outcome, circuits are
currently split on the issue. Disagreeing sister circuits raise important
arguments of statutory interpretation and the role of legislative history in
adopting an express waiver for sovereign immunity under the CAA.
Ultimately the issue must be decided before the Supreme Court, but a
waiver of sovereign immunity appears to be the best outcome in achieving
the purpose and goals of the CAA.
NATALEE M. BINKHOLDER
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